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Abstract—We describe stochastic defense mechanisms designed
to detect sophisticated grid attacks involving both physical actions
(including load modification) and sensor output alteration. The
attacks are undetectable under a full AC power flow model even
assuming ubiquitous sensor placement, while hiding large line
overloads. We first show that such attacks can be computed in
the case of large transmission systems. The defensive techniques
apply network control actions that change voltages in a random
fashion in particular by introducing (random) low-rank correc-
tions to covariance matrices.
Index Terms—Security, cyberphysical power grid attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent events and research efforts have highlighted the
potential for powerful coordinated attacks on power grids
that combine disruption or modification of sensor data with
physical actions. Such attacks may succeed in hiding from
operators undesirable system conditions, long enough that
physical damage or automatic shutdown of equipment takes
place, an undesirable and potentially risky outcome.
We propose defensive techniques to be deployed when a
high-fidelity attack on a power grid is suspected. The attack
is assumed to be partial in the sense that only a subset of
buses and lines are attacked, but this subset is unknown. These
techniques involve two ideas:
(a) using network resources to randomly change power flow
quantities, especially voltages and, in particular
(b) changing the covariance structure of e.g. voltages in
a manner unpredictable by the attacker. The specific
version of this idea that we analyze introduces a low-
rank adjustment to the covariance of phase angles.
These defensive techniques focus on the phase immediately
following the initial attack, and aim to expose inconsistencies
in the data dynamically output by the attacker. We describe
conditions under which the defense succeeds in discovering
the boundary of the attacked zone.
A second focus is on the feasibility of computing very high-
fidelity attacks with a sparse signature. The data component
of the attacks is designed to pass a stringent test, namely that
the falsified data satisfies the full AC power flow equations
at every bus and line. The data attack is coordinated with a
physical attack encompassing various types (line tripping, load
modification) that results in a dangerous system condition, e.g.
a line overload. The data modification hides this overload,
with the result that sensor data received by operators is both
unimpeachable and portrays safe system operation. We term
these attacks “ideal” because, while sparse, they do assume
technical sophistication and the ability to coordinate physical
action and computation. Sparsity is a goal for the attacker be-
cause it increases the likelihood of undetectability long enough
for the overload to lead to line tripping (typically several
minutes). Putting aside the actual feasibility of such attacks,
the computational challenge is significant (a generalization of
the ACOPF problem) and is our focus. We demonstrate that
the attacks can be computed on large transmission systems.
The computational feasibility of high-fidelity attacks moti-
vates our defenses. For presentational ease we describe our
attacks first, in Section III with the defensive mechanisms
given in Section VI.
A. Prior work
The possibility of cyber- or cyberphysical attacks on power
grids has yielded mathematical work designed to detect and
reconstruct such attacks. See [1] [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19].
The starting point of this work is the currently used “State
Estimation” procedure whereby sensor readings are used to-
gether with a linearized model of power flow in order to
estimate other system parameters. In its simplest form, this
procedure uses the DC power flow model,
Bθ = P g − P d, (1)
where B is the bus susceptance matrix, θ is the vector of
phase angles, and P g and P d are (respectively) the vectors
of active power generation and load. Sensors, which may not
be ubiquitous, report phase angles and statistical estimation
procedures can be used to recover missing readings as well
as other operational data. As discussed in the above works
an attacker that is able to modify sensor output may be able
to alter the true phase angles θ through a perturbation δ in
the null space of B, the vector θ′ .= θ + δ is thus consistent
with the equations (1). The resulting attack is thus considered
undetectable. As shown in [1] such attacks may be sparse
(i.e. δ has small support); computation of an optimally sparse
attack is considered in [2]. In the “cyber-physical” version of
an attack the attacker additionally modifies the topology of
the network; in that case the data component of the attack is
designed to hide this fact. Cyber attacks that modify admit-
tances are considered in [18], which also uses inconsistencies
in AC the current-voltage relationship to pinpoint the location
of an attack. [9] performs PCA (principal component analysis)
on the covariance of power flows to discover anomalies by
inspecting changes in the smaller eigenvalue modes, also see
[20], [10], [11], [12], [21], [22].
When the attacker does not have unhindered access to
sensors, or if e.g. the result of the attack is that sensors stop
reporting, sophisticated techniques may still be brought to bear
in order to identify, for example, the topology modification.
See [14]–[17]. Most of the above work relies on the DC
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2(linear) model of power flows; the model in [16] (as far as
we can tell) was the first to use the nonlinear AC power
flows model. Under the assumption that the physical attack
disconnects lines, that defender knows the data-attacked zone
of the grid, and structural assumptions about the attack, the
techniques in [16] recover the attack.
II. NOTATION
We represent AC power flows using the polar representation.
The voltage at a bus k is of the form Vk = |Vk|ejθk where
j =
√−1. A line km is described by using the standard
“pi” model which includes series impedance, line charging and
transformer attributes. See, e.g. [23], [24]. Under this model,
the complex currents injected into line km at bus k and m
(resp.) are given by the formula(
Ikm
Imk
)
= Ykm
(
Vk
Vm
)
, (2)
where Ykm is the branch admittance matrix for line km; the
complex power injected into line km at k equals pkm +
jqkm = VkI
∗
km. Thus pkm = pkm(Vk, Vm) and qkm =
qkm(Vk, Vm) are quadratic functions of the voltages at k and
m, which can be summarized in the form
pkm + jqkm = Skm(|Vk|, |Vm|, θk, θm). (3)
The complex power flow and angle limits on a lime km
are denoted by Smaxkm and θ
max
km (respectively), the voltage
limits at a bus k are given by V mink and V
max
k , and the
active and reactive limits at a generator bus k are indicated
by P g,mink , P
g,max
k and Q
g,min
k , Q
g,max
k (resp.).
Given a bus k we denote by δ(k) the set of all lines of the
form km. N is the set of buses (we write n = |N |) and G is
the set of generator buses1; given a set of buses S we denote
by ∂S (the boundary of S) the subset of buses of S that are
incident with a line with an end not in S.
We model AGC (Automatic Generation Control) as fol-
lows. There is a selected subset of generators R ⊂ G (the
participating generators) and parameters αk ≥ 0 for k ∈ R
(the participation factors) with
∑
k∈R αk = 1. If aggregate
net active power generation changes by some value ∆, with
generator k ∈ R changing its output by αk∆.
The susceptance matrix B of the DC power flow model
(1) is defined by Bkk =
∑
km∈δ(k) 1/xkm for any bus k,
Bkm = −1/xkm for any line km, and Bkm = 0 otherwise;
where xkm > 0 is the reactance of line km.
III. IDEAL ATTACKS
In this section we will focus on a precise formulation for
a high-fidelity attack problem. We use the term ’initial’ to
indicate that the attack comprises actions taken at one point in
time. Later we will discuss a ’dynamic’ phase that follows the
initial attack. The following template applies to this problem:
1For simplicity we assume at most one generator per bus.
Template III.1. Initial Attack
(a) It is assumed that at each bus k there is a sensor
measuring voltage at k and current at each line
km ∈ δ(k).
(b) The attacker has selected a (sparse) subset A of
buses, as well as a target line uv within A that
will be overloaded.
(c) For any bus k ∈ A, the attacker can modify data
provided by a sensor located at k.
(d) The attacker’s physical actions are of two types.
First, the attacker can modify loads at buses in A.
Additionally the attacker can disconnect lines with
both ends in A.
(e) Actions (c)-(d) are performed in a single step.
(f) The data received by the control center satisfies
complete fidelity as per AC power flow equations
and shows all system limits being satisfied, while
in actuality line uv is overloaded.
(g) When the attack includes load changes, secondary
response (i.e. AGC response) is taken into account
by the attacker.
Conditions (a), (f) and (g) amount to a strong form of
undetectability. Nevertheless, we provide examples of large
scale systems that are susceptible to attacks of the form (a)-(g).
Note that we allow loads to be modified, but not generation.
In our numerical examples we enforce that G ∩A = ∅, out of
a perception that generator sites are more carefully protected.
We next present conditions that we will impose so as to
guarantee undetectability. True data will be the true physical
data. In contrast, reported data is that which is actually
received by the control center and includes the attacker’s
modifications. The true data will be given by the (voltage,
current) pair of vectors (V T, IT) whereas the reported data
will be given by (V R, IR).
An important requirement for the reported data is current-
voltage consistency:(
IRkm
IRmk
)
= Ykm
(
V Rk
V Rm
)
, (4)
(i.e.) equation (2). This condition will be enforced in the
computation given below in an indirect fashion (also see [18]
for a different use of this requirement). In general, of course,
an attacker might only seek approximate consistency, using
ambient noise to hide errors. Additionally:
(s.1) On a bus k /∈ A the true and reported data agree (no data
modification outside A, by definition).
(s.2) At a bus k ∈ ∂A the attacker is constrained by the
condition V Rk = V
T
k . This condition is necessary to avoid
attack detection, given (a) and the second equation in (4)
applied to a line km where m /∈ A.
(s.3) On buses k ∈ A − ∂A we may have V Rk 6= V Tk and on
lines with both ends in A − ∂A the true and reported
currents may also differ.
(s.4) The reported voltages and currents must be consistent
with meaningful (complex) power injections. Specifically,
consider a bus k. Then
∑
km∈δ(k) V
R
k I
R∗
km equals the
power injected into the system at bus k, according to
3the reported data. If k /∈ A by definition (of reported and
true data) this sum equals
∑
km∈δ(k) V
T
k I
T∗
km which is the
true power injected by bus k. On the other hand if k ∈ A
the sum may differ from the true injection at k.
(s.5) If the attack causes a net change in the sum of loads,
the resulting AGC-mandated change in generator output
must be taken into account.
Subject to these requirements, the attacker seeks to create a
(true) line overload on uv with both ends in A, while the
reported data shows safe system operation (voltage, angle, and
power flow limits are satisfied). In the next section we present
a mathematical formulation for this problem.
A. Formulation of the initial attack problem
Formally, as an input to the initial attack problem we have
a set A ⊂ N\G of buses, a set of lines L ⊂ E and a line
uv ∈ E − L, with u, v ∈ A. Write AC = N \ A. Let (Sˆgk =
Pˆ gk + jQˆ
g
k)k∈N and (Sˆ
d
k = Pˆ
d
k + jQˆ
d
k)k∈N be (resp.) the
estimated complex power generation and loads at the time
of the attack. We assume that the attacker observes all these
quantities.
The initial attack problem is given by the following formu-
lation. An explanation of the variables and constraints will be
provided below.
Max (pTuv)
2 + (qTuv)
2 (5a)
s.t.
∀k ∈ AC ∪ ∂A, |V Tk | = |V Rk |, θTk = θRk (5b)
∀k ∈ A, −(P d,Rk + jQd,Rk ) =
∑
km∈δ(k)
(pRkm + jq
R
km), (5c)
− (P d,Tk + jQd,Tk ) =
∑
km∈δ(k)\L
(pTkm + jq
T
km), (5d)
P d,Rk ≥ 0, P d,Tk ≥ 0 (5e)
∀k ∈ AC\R :
Pˆ gk − Pˆ dk + j(Qˆgk − Qˆdk) =
∑
km∈δ(k)
(pTkm + jq
T
km) (5f)
∀k ∈ R : P gk − Pˆ gk = αk∆ (5g)
P gk − Pˆ dk + j(Qgk − Qˆdk) =
∑
km∈δ(k)
(pTkm + jq
T
km) (5h)
∀k ∈ G :
P g,mink ≤ P gk ≤ P g,maxk , Qg,mink ≤ Qgk ≤ Qg,maxk (5i)
∀k ∈ N : V mink ≤ |V Tk |, |V Rk | ≤ V maxk (5j)
∀km ∈ E :
|θRk − θRm| ≤ θmaxkm ; |θTk − θTm| ≤ θmaxkm if km /∈ L, (5k)
max{ ‖(pRkm, qRkm)‖ , ‖(pRmk, qRmk)‖ } ≤ Smaxkm , (5l)
pTkm + jq
T
km = Skm(|V Tk |, |V Tm |, θTk , θTm) km /∈ L (5m)
pTmk + jq
T
mk = Smk(|V Tm |, |V Tk |, θTm, θTk ) km /∈ L (5n)
pRkm + jq
R
km = Skm(|V Rk |, |V Rm |, θRk , θRm) (5o)
pRmk + jq
R
mk = Smk(|V Rm |, |V Rk |, θRm, θRk ) (5p)
This formulation uses the following real-valued variables,
where “T” indicates true and “R”, reported:
• |V Tk |, θTk , |V Rk |, θRk ∀ bus k ∈ N (true and reported
voltage magnitudes and angles)
• P d,Tk , Q
d,T
k , P
d,R
k , Q
d,R
k ∀ bus k ∈ A (active and reac-
tive, true and reported loads in A)
• P gk , Q
g
k ∀ bus k ∈ R (generation at participating buses)
• ∀ line km ∈ E , pTkm, qTkm, and also pRkm, qRkm if km /∈ L
(active and reactive, true and reported power flows).
• ∆ (net change in active power generation)
In this formulation, power flows are represented through the
quadratics Pkm, Qkm, Pmk, Qmk (see eqs. (3)) which appear
in the formulation as (5m)-(5p). Also note that the problem
includes voltage variables but no current variables. However,
having solved the above optimization problem, the attacker
reports, for each line km with both ends in A, a current pair
IRkm, I
R
mk computed using the formula(
IRkm
IRmk
)
= Ykm
(
|V Rk |ejθ
R
k
|V Rm |ejθ
R
m
)
,
thereby attaining current-voltage consistency. Note that if
either k ∈ ∂A or m ∈ ∂A the true and reported voltage
values are identical – see Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 1. Consider a feasible solution to problem (5). Let H
denote either T or R (i.e. true or reported). Then the voltages
|V Hk |ejθ
H
k for all k ∈ N yield a solution to the power flow
problem where
(1) Bus k has load P d,Hk + jQ
d,H
k for k ∈ A and Pˆ dk + jQˆdk
if k ∈ AC .
(2) Bus k ∈ G has generation P gk + jQgk if g ∈ R and
Pˆ gk + jQˆ
g
k if k ∈ G \ R.
(3) Line km has power flow pHkm + jq
H
km when H = R and
also when H = T and km /∈ L.
(4) When H = R (reported data) the solution is fully feasible,
i.e. it satisfies voltage, generation, phase angle and power
flow limits.
(5) When H = T (true data) the solution satisfies voltage,
generator and phase angle limits, but only satisfies power
flow limits on lines km with both k,m ∈ AC ∪ ∂A.
Furthermore, the solution is consistent with lines in L
being cut.
Proof. Property (3) follows from constraints (5m)-(5p). Hence,
(1) and (2) follow from constraints (5c)-(5f). Properties (4)-(5)
follow from constraints (5i)-(5l).
As a corollary to (1)-(2) of Lemma 1, a feasible solution
to problem (5) satisfies, exactly, power-injection consistency,
i.e. condition (s.5) above:∑
km∈δ(k)
V Rk I
R∗
km = net injection at k ∀k, (6)
where ’net injection’ is the reported net injection on buses in
A and the true net injection for buses not in A.
Lemma 2. Consider a feasible solution to problem (5). The
solution is consistent with a secondary-response adjustment of
active power generator amounting to ∆ units.
Proof. Follows from constraint (5g).
4Lemma 3. Consider a feasible solution to problem (5). Then
(a) the true and reported voltages agree on AC∪∂A. Further,
(b) the true and reported currents on a line km are identical
if k,m ∈ AC ∪ ∂A.
Proof. (a) Follows from constraint (5b), and (b) is a conse-
quence of (a).
Corollary 4. Suppose we compute a feasible solution to prob-
lem (5) whose objective value is strictly greater than (Smaxuv )
2.
Then the reported solution amounts to an undetectable attack
that hides an overload on line uv.
B. Computational viability
Above we have presented a mathematically correct version
of the initial attack problem that would lead to an (initially)
undetectable attack. However, would such an attack be real-
istic? How would an attacker identify the set A of attacked
buses?
Problem (5) is a nonlinear, nonconvex optimization prob-
lem, and thus, in principle, a challenging computational task.
Nevertheless this problem is similar to the standard ACOPF or
PF problem and (at least) a local optimum should be efficiently
computable; this expectation is borne out by our experiments.
Strict maximization in (5) is not required for an attack to be
successful (all that is needed is an overload of the line uv).
A broader issue concerns the selection of the sets A and
L. This is a combinatorial problem which is bound to be
intractable. In fact [17] describes a number of strong NP-
hardness results in the DC setting, e.g. given vectors of phase
angles θ and θ′ it is NP-hard to compute a set L such that
B′θ′ = Bθ where B′ is the bus susceptance matrix of the
network with L removed.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the literature, an attacker may
be willing to incur significant computational costs in order to
compute a successful attack. While it is reasonable to assume
that an attacker’s ability to take physical action or to modify
data is limited (see the discussion in [1], [2]), not assuming
computational intelligence on the part of an attacker amounts
to a limitation on the part of the defender.
We separate two distinct issues here: first the identification
of the set A, which is done in advance and may be com-
putationally intensive, and second, the solution to problem
(5) which only requires a few seconds. Let us assume that
the attacker has had (undetected) access to system and sensor
data long enough to identify a weak sector of the transmission
system, i.e. the setA. In this task the attacker would rely on the
fact that typical (time- and day-dependent) load and generation
profiles for transmission systems are statistically predictable
with some accuracy. This fact would help the attacker in the
computation of a target set A, perhaps using enumeration,
using load estimates in problem (5).
Having identified a particular set A, problem (5) would
be run once again just prior to the attack, now using close
estimates of the loads obtained from ambient conditions.
Assuming that the attack is perpetrated during a period of
slowly changing loads, and not close in time to a generator
redispatch, the attack will likely be sufficiently numerically
accurate so as to become difficult to detect.
IV. EXAMPLE
In the following instance we consider the case2746wp
(that has 2746 buses) from the Matpower case library
[25]. The adversary attacks the set of buses A =
{1137, 1138, 1139, 1141, 1361, 1491} with A − ∂A =
{1137, 1138, 1141, 1491}. See Figure 1. In this attack the
quantity ∆ in (5g) equals 135.09. We also have L = ∅ (no
lines are cut). The set of generators participating in secondary
response is R = {17, 18, 55, 57, 150, 383, 803, 804, 1996}
with participating factors αk = 1/9 for all k ∈ R.
Table I shows the true and reported flow for lines where the
solutions differ, with a strong overload on lines (1361, 1141)
and (1138, 1141).
TABLE I
TRUE AND REPORTED FLOW FOR ATTACKED LINES. (OVERFLOW IN BOLD)
bus k bus m p
T
km q
T
km ‖(pTkm, qTkm)‖ SmaxkmpRkm qRkm ‖(pRkm, qRkm)‖
1139 1137 3.36 2.66 4.29 114.00
3.36 2.66 4.28
1361 1141 229.01 10.49 229.25 114.00
108.51 10.49 109.02
1141 1491 13.46 2.41 13.68 114.00
6.20 2.39 6.64
1141 1138 209.25 4.44 209.29 114.00
98.06 5.24 98.20
Table II displays the load and generation of the buses
involved in the attack.
TABLE II
LOAD AND GENERATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE ATTACK.
Before Attack After Attack
bus k Pˆ dk Qˆ
d
k P
d,T
k Q
d,T
k P
d,R
k Q
d,R
k
1137 0 0 3.36 2.68 14.74 1.37
1138 103.29 29.84 208.91 3.32 20.82 1.46
1139 0 0 3.36 2.68 15.80 1.37
1141 0 0 5.97 2.64 24.20 1.45
1361 0 0 1.58 2.39 91.90 1.45
1491 4.76 1.12 13.45 2.65 20.58 1.48
gen k Pˆ gk Qˆ
g
k P
g
k Q
g
k αk∆
17 140.00 120.00 155.01 116.90 15.01
18 140.00 41.01 155.01 61.33 15.01
55 130.00 −20.00 145.01 19.29 15.01
57 130.00 −20.00 145.01 38.33 15.01
150 90.00 0 105.01 26.65 15.01
383 21.27 10.54 36.28 13.78 15.01
803 0 0 15.01 6.47 15.01
804 0 10.00 15.01 8.27 15.01
1996 90.00 62.86 105.01 77.28 15.01
1361 1141
1491
1138
1137 1139
1110
135816511041844 1252 1295162585
1287 1512
attacked zone
Fig. 1. Attacked zone A and its neighborhood. Generators are shown in blue.
5V. THE DYNAMIC PHASE
Following the initial attack, the attacker needs to dynam-
ically perturb the attack data so as to produce a realistic
data stream that is both consistent and continues to hide the
overload.
In analogy to our notation for the initial problem, at time
t > 0 following the attack, we denote by V Rk (t) and V
T
k (t)
be reported and true voltages at t and similarly with current.
Reported data for A will be manufactured by the attacker
and (from the attacker’s perspective) need to approximately
satisfy current-voltage consistency (4) and power-injection
consistency (6).
In addition, in this work we assume that the attack is
perpetrated when ambient conditions (in particular loads) are,
approximately, constant. Let us denote by V Rk (0) the voltage
at k computed by the initial attack, i.e.
V Rk (0)
.
= |V Rk |ejθ
R
k
and likewise define the current IRkm(0). The statement that
ambient conditions are approximately constant, post-attack,
can be informally rephrased as
V Rk (t) ≈ V Rk (0) ∀ k, and IRkm(t) ≈ IRkm(0) ∀ km. (7)
If, indeed, ambient conditions are approximately constant (7)
will hold (statistically) for any bus or line not in the attacked
zone A but are a requirement for the attacker.
Two types of attack have been used in the literature. First,
the “noisy data” attack in our setting works as follows:
Template V.1. Noisy Data Attack
At time t > 0 the attacker reports at each bus k ∈ A a
voltage V Rk (t) = V
R
k (0) + νk(t).
Here νk(t) is a random phasor drawn from small
variance, zero mean distributiona. Likewise the attacker
reports for each line km with both ends in A, currents(
IRkm(t)
IRmk(t)
)
=
(
IRkm(0)
IRmk(0)
)
+
(
µkm(t)
µmk(t)
)
(8)
where µkm(t),µmk(t) are drawn from zero mean
distributions with small variance.
aWe use boldface to indicate random variables.
Note that these definitions satisfy requirement (7), and approx-
imately satisfy current-voltage consistency. As a functionally
equivalent alternative to (8) the attacker could simply set(
IRkm(t)
IRmk(t)
)
= Ykm
(
V Rk (t)
V Rm(t)
)
, (9)
our analyses below apply to either form.
A second form of attack that has been considered is the
data replay attack. Here the attacker supplies a previously
observed (or computed) pair of time series V R(t) and IR(t)
for buses and lines within the set A.
1) Discussion: The reader may recall that in the initial
attack computation we enforced that reported voltages in ∂A
are exact, i.e. equal to the true voltages. In the dynamic phase
this condition is necessarily relaxed by the attacker, though
this action carries the risk (to the attacker) that current-voltage
consistency will not hold, statistically, for some line km with
k ∈ ∂A and m /∈ A. Thus e.g. in the noisy data attack
template given above the distributions for the νk(t), µmk(t)
and µkm(t) should have sufficiently small variance relative
to the variance of ambient conditions. Further requirements
on such variances will be discussed in Section VII. In any
case, when ambient conditions (e.g. loads) are nearly constant,
the noisy-data attack may continue to approximately satisfy
current-voltage and power-injection consistency and thus re-
main numerically undetectable. The same holds for the data
replay version provided the replayed voltages in ∂A closely
approximate ambient conditions.
In the next section we present defensive mechanisms that
dynamically change voltages in a way that is unpredictable to
an attacker. The key observation is that a substantial change
to voltages in ∂A will cause the noisy-data attack, applied
verbatim as in Template V.1, to fail, because of large current-
voltage inconsistencies on lines km with k ∈ ∂A and m /∈ A.
Of course, the template need not be applied verbatim, and in
particular the attacker may seek to leverage the possibility of
sensor error. We will consider this point in the next section.
In [16] current-voltage consistency is used in a different
setting: (i) the attacked zone A is known by the defender,
(ii) the attacker only disconnects lines. Under a number of
assumptions, in particular that there is a matching between
AC and A that covers all buses in A it is shown that the
attack can be accurately recovered.
VI. DEFENSE
In the above sections we showed that, conceptually at least,
it is possible to compute high-fidelity attacks that disguise dan-
gerous network conditions. Other attacks are also potentially
conceivable, e.g. impedance changes, transformer tap changes,
etc. In this section we describe a generic randomized defense
strategy that can deployed when a complex attack is suspected.
We will assume that the attack impacts a proper subset A of
the system that is unknown to the control center, as was the
case above, though the generic defense strategy applies under
more general attacks as well. The strategy can be summarized
by the following template:
Procedure VI.1. Random Defense.
Iterate:
D1: Choose, for each k ∈ G a (random) value δk such
that
∑
g∈G δk ≈ 0. Command each generator k ∈ G to
change its output to P gk + δk.
D2: Following the generation change in step D1
identify inconsistencies in the observed sensor readings.
Each iteration would last several seconds, and statistically
significant inconsistencies identified by this scheme would be
flagged as potential evidence of an attack. The above strategy
could be AGC-like if only generators k ∈ R (the responding
generators) are allowed to have δk 6= 0 and in general it
amounts to a generator redispatch. An additional point is that
an implementation of step D1 should guarantee safe system
operation; this consideration leads to computation of the δk in
step D1 by means of an OPF-like problem.
We note that there is an existing literature on using network
resources so as to change power flow physics in order to detect
6structure or faults. See [26], [27], [28], [29], [30]. Indeed,
even though the description of our random defense focuses
on power injections, one could also consider other random
probing strategies that change power flows, such as adjusting
transformer settings, controlled line tripping, and the use of
DERs, storage and FACTS devices.
There are several implementations of the generic strategy.
Generally the defender wants to make the |δk| large because to
first order changes in voltage angles are proportional to ‖δ‖2,
and a large change in phase angles is likely to give rise to a
significant current-voltage or power-injection inconsistencies
in sensor readings in ∂A, as discussed above. This idea forms
the basis for a simple, current-consistency based version of
Template VI.1 given in Section VI-A.
An attacker aware that the random defense strategy is
applied may try to replace e.g. the noisy data attack with
a more careful manipulation of reported data. For example,
the attacker could react to a significant change to voltages in
∂A by solving a nonlinear, nonconvex system of inequalities
designed to guarantee approximate current-voltage and power-
injection consistency. In addition, any implied load change
within A must be very small (or it would contradict observed
frequencies). Finally the attacker would need to perform this
computation very quickly, and repeatedly (because the defense
will be applied repeatedly).
A more practicable alternative (for the attacker) would be to
consider arbitrary changes to voltages in buses in ∂A, with the
remaining voltages in A obtained as in Template V.1. We will
term this the enhanced noisy data attack. In Section VI-A we
will show that when the random defense causes large-enough
voltage changes in ∂A, the enhanced noisy-data attack fails.
See Lemma 5.
A more sophisticated defensive idea, given in Section VII,
changes the stochastics of power flow data, in particular
voltage covariance, and probes the corresponding properties
of the reported data.
Our defensive strategies can be easily adjusted if sensors
are not available throughout the system. Of course, the fewer
the sensors the more limited the impact of the defense. Indeed,
some interesting work (using the standard, DC-equation state
estimation) precisely seeks to perform system identification
post-attack when only limited sensor information is available
[14], [15], [16], [17].
A. Current-voltage defense
Next we describe a particular implementation of step D2
of the generic defensive strategy which relies on the current-
voltage consistency condition (4). This implementation will
take into account the possibility of sensor error. Whereas
above a phasor φ had a true value φT (the physical value)
and a reported value φR (the value received by the control
center), now we will have the sensed value φS which is the
value actually produced by the sensor. Reported and sensed
data arising from sensors not controlled by the attacker are
equal, but may differ at sensors within A.
In addition, sensed and true data may differ. For a phasor φ
define err(φ) .= φS−φT. In the PMU setting, the TVE (total
vector error) criterion [31], [32] guarantees that
|err(φ)| < τ |φT|, (10)
where 0 < τ < 1 is a tolerance. Standards enforce τ = 1%,
though experimental testing of PMUs shows far smaller errors
[33]. From (10) we obtain
(1− τ)|φT| < |φS| < (1 + τ)|φT| (11a)
|err(φ)| < τ(1− τ)−1|φS|. (11b)
We will describe three voltage-current criteria. An impor-
tant point is that the current-voltage consistency condition,
combined with estimations of possible sensor error, yield a
nonlinear relationship, and appropriately reformulation of this
relationship can render useful benefits. To simplify notation
we will drop the “(t)” from phasors though it should be
understood throughout. For a line km write
Ykm =
(
Y
(1)
km Y
(2)
km
Y
(3)
km Y
(4)
km
)
Criterion 1. We have that ITmk = Y
(3)
kmV
T
k + Y
(4)
kmV
T
m . Write
Z
(3)
km
.
= [Y
(3)
km ]
−1. Hence
V Sk − Z(3)km(ISmk − Y (4)kmV Sm) =
err(Vk) − Z(3)km(err(Imk)− Y (4)km err(Vm)) (12)
which yields, using (10), (11b), and the triangle inequality
|V Sk − Z(3)km(ISmk − Y (4)kmV Sm)| <
τ |V Tk |+
τ |Z(3)km|
1− τ (|I
S
mk|+ |Y (4)km | |V Sm|) =
τ |Z(3)km(ITmk − Y (4)kmV Tm )|+
τ |Z(3)km|
1− τ (|I
S
mk|+ |Y (4)km | |V Sm|) ≤
2τ |Z(3)km|
1− τ (|I
S
mk|+ |Y (4)km | |V Sm|). (13)
Under Criterion 1, if, statistically, the reported phasors
V Rk , V
R
m , I
R
mk fail to satisfy (13) line km is flagged as sus-
picious. A similar analysis concerns V Rk , V
R
m , I
R
km. Remark:
By construction, if k,m /∈ A then line km will not be flagged.
Criteria 2 and 3. Proceeding as above we have
|ISkm − Y (1)kmV Sk − Y (2)kmV Sm| <
τ
1− τ (|I
S
km|+ |Y (1)km ||V Sk |+ |Y (2)km ||V Sm|). (14)
(and similarly with Imk), and when line km is a pure
impedance line (no transformer) with charging susceptance
bkm,
|ISkm + ISmk| <
|bkm|
2(1− τ) (|V
S
k |+ |V Sm|) +
τ
1− τ (|I
S
km|+ |ISmk|). (15)
If the reported phasors do not satisfy (14) or (15) then the line
is flagged.
71) Discussion: Note that a line not attacked will not be
flagged, as per the TVE condition. Additional criteria can
be developed to handle power-injection consistency. However,
Criterion 1 alone can suffice to defeat the attacker (i.e. uncover
inconsistencies) when voltage angles are sufficiently changed
under our random defense. To understand this point, consider
a bus k ∈ ∂A such that there is a line km with m /∈ A and
also a line ka where a ∈ A− ∂A.
We study an iteration of the random defense which (to
simplify notation) we assume begins at time t = 0. Consider
line ka first. To avoid having line ak flagged, the attacker t will
need to manufacture a time series V Rk (t), V
R
a (t) and I
R
ak(t)
that (statistically) satisfy (13). But under the noisy data attack,
on average V Ra (t) = V
R
a (0) and I
R
ak(t) = I
R
ak(0). Hence the
attacker needs (on average) that
2τ |Z(3)ka |
1− τ (|I
R
ak(0)|+ |Y (4)ka | |V Ra (0)|) >
|V Rk (t)− Z(3)ka (IRak(0)− Y (4)ka V Ra (0))| = |V Rk (t)− V Rk (0)|
Now consider line km. Since m /∈ A, V Rm (t) = V Sm(t) and
IRmk(t) = I
S
mk(t). Also, denote:
• V Tk (∗) = the true voltage at k at the start of the current
iteration of the random defense, i.e. the voltage resulting
from the injection changes in step D1. Then, assuming
unbiased sensor errors and zero-mean ambient noise,
V Tm (∗) will equal the expectation of V Tm (t) during the
iteration.
• Likewise define the current ITmk(∗).
Hence the attacker needs (on average) that
2τ |Z(3)km|
1− τ (|I
T
mk(∗)|+ |Y (4)km | |V Tm (∗)|) >
|V Rk (t)− Z(3)km(ITmk(∗)− Y (4)kmV Tm (∗))| = |V Rk (t)− V Tk (∗)|.
As a result of these observations we have:
Lemma 5. Consider buses k, a,m as described above. Sup-
pose that
|V Tk (∗)− V Rk (0)| >
2τ |Z(3)ka |
1− τ (|I
R
ak(0)|+ |Y (4)ka | |V Ra (0)|)
+
2τ |Z(3)mk|
1− τ (|I
T
mk(∗)|+ |Y (4)km | |V Tm (∗)|) (16)
Then it is impossible for the enhanced noisy data attacker to
statistically satisfy Criterion 1 on both lines ka and km.
Comment: This lemma highlights how large changes in
voltages caused by the random defense challenge the attacker.
2) Experiment: Next we describe a set of experiments
involving the current-voltage defense applied to the attack
given in Section IV. The current defense was implemented
as follows:
• For any generator bus k /∈ R, |δk| ≤ P gk . We used values
 = 0.01, 0.05.
• The set of responding generators, R, was of cardinality
200. For k ∈ R |δk| can be arbitrarily large. We chose
δk > 0 with probability 1/2.
• No generator may exceed its limits (voltage or genera-
tion), but subject to all these conditions we maximize∑
k∈G |δk|.
In Table III, we perform the above analysis on the lines
(k = 1139, a = 1137) and (k = 1139,m = 1110) with
τ = 0.01. “Ratio” is the ratio of the left-hand side to the right-
hand side of expression (16). We see that the condition for
Lemma 5 is amply satisfied. A similar analysis pertains to line
(1141, 1361), the other line connecting A to its complement.
TABLE III
CURRENT-VOLTAGE DEFENSE.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
 0.01 0.05∑
k∈G δ
+
k 289.01 964.77∑
k∈G δ
−
k 174.47 256.04
Line (k = 1139, a = 1137)
|V Ra (0)|∠θRa (0) 1.0919∠− 6.993◦ 1.0919∠− 6.993◦
IRak(0) −0.0275 + 0.0281j −0.0275 + 0.0281j
Line (k = 1139,m = 1110)
|V Tm (∗)|∠θTm(∗) 1.0309∠− 7.822◦ 1.0391∠− 7.848◦
ITmk(∗) 0.0905− 0.4976j 0.1289− 0.4901j
Voltages at k = 1139
|V Rk (0)|∠θRk (0) 1.0919∠− 6.991◦ 1.0919∠− 6.991◦
|V Tk (∗)|∠θTk (∗) 1.0104∠− 7.822◦ 1.0187∠− 7.936◦
Lemma 5 applied to bus k = 1139
Ratio 1.913 1.732
B. Controlling voltages through generation changes
From a basic perspective, an application of the current-
voltage version of Procedure VI.1 will succeed when voltages
in ∂A are sufficiently changed. The defender, of course, does
not know the set A and thus it is of interest to understand when
the voltage at any given bus can be changed by appropriately
choosing the injections δ.
We will provide a deterministic, positive answer to this issue
by considering the DC power flow approximation (1), and for
simplicity focus on cases where |D| = 2. Thus, let s and t be
two buses in R, let ∆ > 0, and let Pˆ g be defined by
Pˆ gs = P
g
s + ∆, Pˆ
g
t = P
g
t −∆, Pˆ gk = P gk otherwise.
Lemma 6. Suppose Bθ = P g −P d, and Bθˆ = Pˆ g −P d. Let
k 6= t be a bus such that the network contains a path between
s and k that does not include t. Then
θˆk − θˆt > θk − θt. (17)
Proof. Equation (17) does not change if we subtract from every
θˆh any constant, and likewise with the θh. Thus, without loss
of generality θˆt = θt = 0. Under this assumption (17) reads:
θˆk − θk > 0. (18)
Let M be the set of buses p 6= t such that
(1) The network contains a path from s to p that avoids t,
and
(2) Subject to (1), θˆp − θp is minimum.
Aiming for a contradiction, we will assume that
θˆp − θp ≤ 0 for p ∈M. (19)
8Showing that (19) is false yields (18). For any line km define
the flow value fkm = (θˆk − θˆm − θk + θm)/xkm. Since
B(θˆ − θ) = Pˆ g − P g , the flow vector f corresponds (under
the DC power flow model) to a power flow with ∆ units of
generation at s, ∆ units of load at t, and zero generation and
load elsewhere. Note that for any line km, fkm > 0 iff
θˆk − θk > θˆm − θˆm. (20)
This observation implies
θˆs − θs > 0. (21)
[To obtain this fact, decompose the flow vector f into a set
of path flows from s to t and telescope (20) along any such
path.] Pick any p ∈ M and let P be a path from s to p that
avoids t. Say P = v0, v1, . . . , vi where v0 = s and vi = p,
and let h be smallest such that vh ∈M . By (21) s /∈M , i.e.,
h > 0. Then by definition of h, θˆvh−1 − θvh−1 > θˆvh − θvh ,
i.e. fvh−1,vh > 0. But by assumption vh 6= t. So there exists
some line vh,m such that fvh,m > 0. Therefore using the
assumption θˆk − θk ≤ 0 for all k ∈M , vh ∈M , and (20),
0 ≥ θˆvh − θvh > θˆm − θm. (22)
So m 6= t, and as a result by construction there is a path from
s to m that avoids t. But then (22) contradicts the fact that
vh ∈M .
Lemma 6 guarantees a nontrivial voltage angle at any bus
k assuming a structural relationship between k, s and t.
Furthermore,
Lemma 7. Suppose k is any bus and that |R| ≥ 2. Then a
pair s, t satisfying the assumptions of Lemma 6 exists.
Proof. Choose s ∈ R such that s is closest to k.
C. Attack reconstruction
In the previous sections we described defensive procedures
that correctly identify a set of lines and or buses as compro-
mised by the attack, under fairly general conditions. In this
section we will present a fast algorithm that to broaden the
classification of buses and lines (as safe, or not) to encompass
the entire network. A central idea in this approach is the
concept of a trusted bus. A bus k is trusted if the control
center can expect that all sensors located at k provide truthful
output; we assume that at least one trusted bus exists (see
[13] for related discussions). Without such an assumption the
entire suite of signals received by the control centers could be
falsified and it is questionable whether any meaningful attack
reconstruction can be performed.
To simplify the discussion, we will also use the following:
Assumption. For any bus k ∈ ∂A there is a line km with
m ∈ A− ∂A.
This assumption can be justified as follows. For any bus h ∈
∂A, as we have discussed above sensors at h report correct or
approximate coorect voltage values. If k ∈ ∂A does not satisfy
the assumption, then every line km is such that m /∈ A or m ∈
∂A. Then, assuming the initial attack satisfied current-voltage
consistency for every line, all current readings provided by
sensors at k are also correct. In summary, all readings by
sensors at k are correct and the attacker may simply remove k
from the attacked set without impacting the attack itself. Our
main reconstruction technique is given in the next template.
Procedure VI.2. Attack reconstruction.
Initialization: Every trusted bus is labeled safe and
every other bus is labeled unsafe. Some subset of the
lines are labeled compromised.
Iterate:
1: If we can find a line km such that k is safe, m is
unsafe and no line incident with m is compromised,
then we relabel m as safe.
2: If we can find a line km such that k is safe, m is
unsafe and there is a compromised line mh, then we
relabel m as attacked.
3: If there are no lines km of the type described in
steps 1 or 2 then STOP.
In each step 1 or 2 one bus is relabeled from unsafe to safe or
attacked; hence the procedure must stop after a finite number
of iterations. The impact (and correctness) of this procedure
is described by the following results.
Lemma 8. At termination of the procedure, any bus m that
is labeled safe satisfies m /∈ A.
Proof. By assumption, no trusted bus has been attacked. Thus,
aiming for a contradiction, consider the first iteration of the
procedure where in Step 1 a line km is used to label bus m as
safe, and yet m ∈ A. Since bus k was previously labeled as
safe, by induction it follows that k /∈ A and therefore it follows
that m ∈ ∂A. But then there is a line of the form mh that is
compromised as per the current test. This fact contradicts the
choice of km in Step 1.
Corollary 9. Suppose that at termination a bus m is labeled
safe. Then there is a path P from a trusted bus s, to m, such
that k /∈ A for every bus k ∈ P .
Lemma 10. At termination of the procedure, any bus m that
is labeled attacked satisfies m ∈ ∂A.
Proof. Any bus m that is labeled attacked at termination,
was relabeled as such when considering a line km in some
execution of Step 2. The corresponding bus k, by Lemma 8,
satisfies k /∈ A. Then clearly m ∈ ∂A.
Definition: Let T be the set of connected components of N −
A that include trusted buses.
Lemma 11. Let K be any of the components of N − A.
Suppose K contains a trusted bus. Then at termination of the
procedure all buses of K are safe.
Proof. At the initialization of the procedure all trusted buses
are safe and hence K includes at least one safe bus. We need
to prove that at termination of the procedure, all buses in K
are safe. If that were not the case it would follow (since K is
connected) that at termination there is a line km ∈ K with k
safe and m unsafe. But that is a contradiction given Step 1
of the procedure.
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Suppose K does not contain a trusted bus. Then at termination
of the procedure all buses of K are unsafe.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 9.
Lemma 12 points out the implications resulting from a weak
set of trusted buses. A careful choice of A can result on
components of N − A without trusted buses, which are still
unsafe at the conclusion of the procedure. If we can assume,
for example, that all participating generators (or all generators)
are located in trusted buses, current grid economics guarantees
that such buses will be located throughout the network, which
works to minimize the impact of Lemma 12.
As a final remark, Procedure VI.2 is a special case of the
standard reachability algorithm and thus can be implemented
to run in time linear in the number of buses and lines.
1) Numerical experiments using AC power flows: The
above discussion concerns DC power flows. In order to
investigate how voltages changee under injection changes,
under AC power flows, we perform a experiments using
examples from the Matpower library. For each system we
perform ten experiments. In each experiment we compute an
AC power flow which is constrained to satisfying the given
voltage bounds at all generator buses, but not at load buses,
as well as power injection constraints and generator limits,
while allowing large injection changes in a random subset of
generators. For a non-generator bus k, let V bk be its voltage
in the base case (i.e. the Matower case), and let Vi,k be its
voltage in experiment i = 1, . . . , 10. Finally, define
score(k) .= max
1≤i≤10
|Vi,k − V bk |
|V bk |
.
In Table IV, “Min Score” is the minimum score across all
non-generator buses. Thus the table provides experimental
verification for substantial AC voltage changes under random
generator injections.
TABLE IV
AC VOLTAGE CHANGES
Case Min Score Average Score
case118 11.61% 32.77%
case1354pegase 7.62% 51.00%
case2746wp 5.00% 10.09%
VII. COVARIANCE DEFENSE
In this section we describe a different defense mechanism
motivated by the fact that real-world PMU data streams exhibit
non-generic stochastic structure in (for example) voltage an-
gles [20], [34]. In particular, covariance matrices across several
time scales have very low rank, and “noise” (data deviations
from averages) is strongly non-Gaussian. We additionally
assume that the buses in the set F are trusted, as in Section
VI-C.
Let us consider, as an example, the post-attack voltage
angle vector θ = (θk : k ∈ N ). Following the attack we
obtain a time series θR(t) of measurements of this vector
(including data corrupted by the attacker). The control center
can efficiently and approximately learn statistics of θ, in
particular closely estimate its covariance matrix [35], which
we denote by Ω.
Under the covariance defense we choose a (random) vector
v ∈ Rn. Then we perform a number of substeps (“epochs”,
each lasting a second or less); in each substep the output of
generators in F is perturbed by a random vector δ calculated
so that Ω is additively altered by a rank-1 correction. This
perturbation in stochastics may (eventually) be understood by
the attacker, but in the intervening period the attacker will
generate inconsistent data. More discussion is given below.
In the template given next, λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λr > 0
are the set of eigenvalues of Ω that are larger than a certain
threshold  > 0, and let w1, w2, . . . , wr be the corresponding
eigenvectors. Let B¯ be a pseudoinverse of the bus susceptance
matrix B. Finally let ∆ > 0 be large compared to .
Procedure VII.1. Covariance Defense.
Input:
A zero-mean distribution P with support in [−1, 1].
Iterate:
V1: Choose a nonzero vector v ∈ Rn so that
(a) (Bv)k = 0 ∀ k /∈ F ,
(b) wTi v = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r
(c) for each k ∈ F , the output value P gk ±∆(Bv)k
is feasible for generator k.
V2: For s = 1, 2, . . . perform epoch s:
(a) Draw x from P .
(b) Alter power injection at each k ∈ F by x∆(Bv)k.
Next we comment on this procedure. V1(a)-(b) is a linear
system on n variables and |F| − r degrees of freedom, and
thus has a nonzero solution when |F| > r. In addition V1(c)
can be attained with nonzero v if we further assume that the
buses in F can all “ramp up” and “ramp down” (if necessary
by scaling ∆).
Next we analyze the procedure. We assume that the attacker
does not react to the variance defense; this assumption will
be discussed below. Consider an execution of step V2(b), and
define δ .= x∆v. Using V1(a) and V2(b) the n-vector of
power injection changes is given by Bδ. Further,
E(δ) = 0 and σ2δ = λvv
T where λ .= σ2x∆
2. (23)
Let us denote by Bˆ the bus admittance matrix of the network,
post-attack (unknown to the control center). Let θˆT be the
(random) vector of true voltage phase angles during an execu-
tion of Step V2, and let θT be the (also random) true vector
of voltage phase angles prior to the defense (here randomness
is driven primarily by ambient noise in loads and resulting
generation adjustments). Under the DC model,
BˆθˆT = P g − P d +Bδ. (24)
Let B¯ denote a (left) pseudoinverse of Bˆ. We then have
θˆT = B¯(P g − P d +Bδ) = θT + B¯Bδ. (25)
As a result we have, where u .= B¯Bv:
Lemma 13. Suppose that the random variable x in the
covariance defense is stochastically independent of ambient
noise. Then σ2
θˆT
= σ2θT + λuu
T .
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Proof sketch. The absence of a cross-term is justified by the
independence assumption.
Thus the covariance of (true) phase angles experiences a
rank-1 correction; this observation applies under the DC model
and only approximately under the AC model. In summary:
(a) The defender does not observe σ2
θˆT
(or σ2θT ). Indeed,
the (A,A)-submatrix of the covariance matrix actually
observed by the defender equals ΩA,A both before and
after the defense. The (Ac,Ac)-submatrix of σ2
θˆT
is
observed.
(b) If, in an execution of step V2, the defender expects that
uk 6= 0 for all k then the defender, aware of Lemma 13,
expects to see a nonzero change in every entry of the
covariance matrix.
In summary if the defender expects (b) to hold then the
attacked zone A will be discovered. In this regard, note that
B¯Bv is the change of phase angles resulting from injections
Bv. Hence, using e.g. Lemma 6, if v is sufficiently dense we
would expect (b) to hold.
The result is stronger when Bˆ = B (e.g. when the attack
only involves load modifications). In that case Lemma 13
reduces to σ2
θˆT
= σ2θT + λvv
T and, by construction ((b) of
Step V1) the rank-1 correction is approximately orthogonal to
the (observed) covariance matrix Ω.
The above discussion assumed that the attacker does not
react to the covariance defense. In principle the attacker
could, for example, try to modify the covariance of voltage
data restricted to A. The challenge to the attacker is that
this action must also preserve voltage-current (and power-
injection) consistency. Additionally the attacker might first
want to identify the new covariance structure that the defender
has imposed. Such “learning” would require observations, i.e.
time, during which the attacker is still expected to produce data
readings, producing an error trail; the fact that the covariance
defense as it iterates through steps V1 repeatedly changes the
covariance structure is an additional challenge.
As argued, the effectiveness of the covariance defense
hinges on finding vectors v with large support, so that the
term λvvT is likely to correlate buses inside and outside the
(unknown) attacked zone A. To this effect, a vector v ∈ Rn
satisfying V1(a)-(b) will be called useful. We first have:
Lemma 14. Suppose v1 and v2 are useful. Then there exist
infinitely many scalars λ such that v1+λv2 is useful and with
support equal to the union of supports of v1 and v2.
Proof. Suppose v1k 6= 0 or v2k 6= 0. Then v1k + λv2k = 0 for at
most one value λ.
Second, given parameters w1, . . . , wn, consider the LP:
Max
∑
k
wkvk, s.t. v satisfies V1(a)-(b), |vk| ≤ 1, ∀ k
Appropriate choices of parameters wk will encourage dense
(large support) vectors; in particular by iterating through
several choices of the wk one can encourage different indices k
to appear in the support of v. In the above attack example using
case2746wp, this idea yields a family of 10 useful vectors
whose support covers the set of all buses. Using Lemma 14
we obtain one useful vector v with vk 6= 0 for all k.
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